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Preface
Zimbabwe’s longstanding partition between commercial land, communal land, and natural areas
is fast collapsing. As a consequence new forms of agrarian production and trade are emerging;
chiefly, out-grower schemes, share-cropping, community-based tourism, and small-scale game 
conservancies. This volume explores the social dimensions of these arrangements and, in 
particular, the ways in which they represent contracts between stronger and weaker parties. To 
what extent do those contracts exploit weaker parties, such as, out-growers? To what extent do 
they confer economic security on those same parties? Finally, how do these contracts -  in the 
midst of economic crisis -  reshape development, conservation, and land-use writ-large in rural 
Zimbabwe? This volume includes all the papers presented at the workshop, as well as an one 
additional piece each by Joseph Mtisi and David McDermott Hughes.
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Resettlement and Contract farming in Zimbabwe: 
the Case o f Mushandike
by
Vupenyu Dzingirai
Virginia Foundation for the Humanities and Public Policy 
University o f  Virginia, USA
Introduction
Until the introduction of the structural adjustment programme, post independent smallholder 
agriculture in Zimbabwe’s resettlement schemes was dominated by the state (Bratton, 1994). 
Inspired by the experiences of the socialist countries which had played a key role in the 
predominantly land based liberation struggle, the state played, for most resettlement schemes, the 
role of manager, deciding how, when and what was to be grown (Mumbengegwi, 1987). The 
state could afford to do this because it was the source for all inputs, from seeds fertilizers, 
pesticides and herbicides. This high-handed managerial role was complemented by another 
sophisticated one: control of marketing. Eager to get as much as possible from the peasants and 
doubting the ability of peasants to conduct marketing, the state cast itself as the only purchaser of 
resettlement produce. To capture grain from peasants as well as reduce wastages, the state 
installed, as everywhere in Africa, marketing depots, filling up these with state functionaries 
(Bates, 1981; Berry, 1984; Scott, 1998). For various reasons including those relating to the 
collapse of socialism, the state’s dominant role in resettlement agriculture has, now, been 
dismantled and from its ruins has emerged a new regime based on partnership with private 
business. With inputs in hand and assured markets for every crop sown under contract, private 
business promises a lighter yoke to the smallholder. While these partnerships now mark the 
landscape and continue to multiply with each new resettlement scheme, there is very little 
research problematising them. Even though there is a rich corpus of knowledge about contract 
farming elsewhere (Watts and Little, 1994; Barnett, 1984), we still do not know how these 
contracts are framed. There remains an agenda to unravel how these contracts are formed as well 
as to illuminate their nature. Could it be that these contracts are ambiguous on obligations of 
buyers and clear on obligations of growers? And what has been the impact of these contracts on 
the growers? These are pertinent questions as those touching on the significance of these 
contracts on the Zimbabwe’s unfolding resettlement and land reform programme.
This paper represents an attempt to understand these new relationships in the context of land 
resettlement in Zimbabwe. In particular, I seek to understand how these agrarian contracts are 
framed, and what this framing means for smallholders. But I also seek to understand whether 
contract farming can complement and enrich the ongoing land reform and resettlement 
programme, which has tended to be mechanistic and state driven. My conclusion is that in spite
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of the rhetoric, contract fanning emerges as a mechanism to reorient smallholder agriculture in 
ways that answers to the needs of private business. The politics of ambiguity and clarity in 
agrarian contracts and the increased surveillance through placement of local level agents 
constitute the strategic instruments for this reorientation of agriculture. The attempt to interlock 
smallholder agriculture with industrial needs and operations in turn generates bitterness among 
smallholders who remain in the partnership for theft and other alternative legalities that side­
marketing, etc, and for lack of viable alternatives. The condition where smallholders become tied 
to private business] arises and persists in part because there lacks a mechanism to restrain private 
business in ways that simultaneously protect smallholder interests or at the very least. The utility 
of contract farming as a vehicle for improving smallholder agriculture even in the new 
resettlement schemes of Zimbabwe will depend on the degree to which farmers reorganize to 
become a force to engage private business. The material for the paper comes from Mushandike, a 
planned resettlement scheme where Canners, a big agri-business concern, is enticing 
unorganized people into amorphous contracts for perishable products and non perishable crops 
[beans and tomatoes] from which it is easy to make a case for the company but predictably 
difficult to make peasant claims or restitution from it.
Mushandike Resettlement: A short Background
Mushandike is a planned resettlement scheme in Masvingo, a semi arid province that has been 
the focus of state-initiated agricultural development seeking to modernize smallholder 
agriculture. Its members randomly selected [by lots] and, as private business wishing to control 
smallholders through community control would painfully discover, scarcely share common 
backgrounds. The smallholders who number 445 households (for the entire scheme, but 49 for 
the study village) come from the surrounding densely populated hilly districts constituting the 
province. These districts or reserves, into which Africans were colonially concentrated and 
protected (Arrighi and Saul, 1973; Hughes, 2001), include Chivi, Masvingo, Nyajena and 
Mapanzure.
From its inception, Mushandike represented a nationalist project in which fanners existed for the 
state. The new settlers were mandated to industriously produce commodities for the good of 
country and to justify the war of liberation, whose bloody battlefields included the hills and 
valleys of Mushandike1. Each farmer had 1,5 ectare plots, each located in one of the three blocks 
devoted to a particular crop determined by the state. The seeds [for cotton, maize and wheat) 
fertilizers, pesticides, water were all advanced by the state, which recovered the costs through a 
stop order system. This arrangement ensured not only that settlers produced but also that they 
did so in ways that met the requirements of the state. Paradoxically, many settlers did not mind 
being state-laborers. Their contention was that they were not remunerated well even as laborers. 
In Mushandike, the state, through its various marketing arms which included the Cotton 
Marketing Board [now Cotton Company of Zimbabwe] and Grain Marketing Board bought 
smallholder produce at preset prices, and after deducting multiple costs (which included 
transport, levies, inputs) passed the balance (where applicable) to the producer. This irked 
peasants and, as I shall show in the paper later on, would be the source of friction even with 
those private companies displacing the state but inheriting its infrastructure.
1 Interview with Chief Charumbira, Mushandike, 25/7/2002.
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Smallholders lived in numbered homesteads, which were slotted in lineal villages modeled after 
the colonial villigisation programme of the sixties (Drinkwater, 1989). This form of organisation, 
which was also mapped, enabled the state to pin point and access those individuals believed to be 
lazy, growing the wrong crop or investing in immovable property. Although not one settler had 
the permission to stay in the scheme revoked by the state, many, including those with prior 
claims to Mushandike, were aware that their chance of a peaceful sojourn depended on their 
being in step with the state. And if there is any reason the smallholders would welcome the 
private sector in the framework of contract farming, it is because they needed a break from the 
state’s continuous precepts about resettlement tenure and tenuous conditions.
In Mushandike, as indeed in all other resettlement schemes, the state was never far away and 
invisible. It was represented by the department of Agriculture and Extension whose motorized 
staff, reduced risk through timely provision of technical advice (on diseases and pest control and 
coordinating marketing to the state) and also enforced the block system which devoted a single 
crop to all plots constituting a block. But it was the Resettlement Officer who epitomized the 
state, because on him rested the formal power to expel settlers from the scheme. Far from 
facilitating smallholder agriculture, these officers gave weight to nationalist objectives, ensuring 
that resettlement agriculture smoothly reflected its needs. And quite unpredictably, the same 
contingent of agrarian functionaries would in the 90s transfer their loyalty to private business, 
which displaced the state in smallholder agriculture. In Mushandike, state agricultural officers 
now welcome and mingle with contract farming managers from agribusiness firms.
If resettlement as a nationalist project was tolerable in the early formative years of resettlement 
when liberation war memories were still fresh, it became increasingly unacceptable to the new 
fanners wanting to accumulate personal wealth. As in other places where state control is 
pronounced, this lack of fit between what smallholders wanted and imagined about resettlement 
and what they practically realized ultimately generated discontent.and rebellion even if this was 
of hidden nature (Hyden, 198; Hart, 1982; Scott, 1992). Thus at night, when visibility was 
difficult and when all the state officials were asleep and retired to their removed compound 
overlooking the scheme, or during those days when the functionaries were absent, perhaps 
attending to their family needs or participating in the many workshops on rural development 
held in the town of Masvingo, embittered fanners crossed, with their loaded and covered carts, 
the Tokwe River in the west to sell grain to the food deficient areas which include Chivi, 
Shurugwi and Charumbira2. Tenants also, transferred their labour and effort to dry-land 
fanning within the scheme and secretly rented their plots to colleagues able to do farming 
without credit support from the state. In the village as many as a third of the tenants leased their 
land to the urban dwellers of Masvingo. It is also for this reason that some farmers reversed their 
settlement in favor of those places in the margins, including the Zambezi Valley, Gokwe and the 
Lowveld (Nyambara, 2001; Dzingirai, 1999; 1994). If there is anything smallholders learnt from 
this form of collectivization, it is knowing that champions of development including the state,
2 Residents o f Chivi and Shurugwi confirmed these clandestine sales o f  grain which emerged in the 
1980s (Dzingirai, 1992). I also recall, as a young man, my own parents dealing, in the 1980s, with 
these sellers who by the break o f day would have crossed the Tokwe River to do business with Chivi 
people located 20km from the scheme.
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can after all be beaten and cheated, if only victims can be brave, risky and smart3. It is a lesson 
that the producers would, in order to survive, reluctantly applied in the framework of new private 
sector-driven agrarian contracts.
Partly because of the shift to market economy, the state has partially withdrawn from 
Mushandike and other schemes and has been superceded by agri-business firms which 
traditionally preferred working with big commercial farmers. The firms would rather they did 
business within the framework of contract farming. This urban-based contingent desiring to work 
within this framework is varied and includes PANA, COTTCO, GMB and, Canners, the subject 
of this paper.
A huge vegetable processing company which has been working with Mushandike growers 
since 1998,, Canners is located in the hilly town of Mutare, some 300km from the low-lying 
smallholder resettlement. For the company, Mushandike constitutes an agrarian frontier into 
which it is only expanding from other schemes and commercial farms bordering Mutare. The 
vision which the company has is of a landscape of contracts, one in which every small producer 
is networked to the company as its predictable producer. As the section below suggests, this is a 
vision, which can only be realised through a careful manipulation of symbols. In the section 
below, I discuss how the company presents contract farming.
Canners and contract farming
Although the company constantly refers to the need for their formalisation and regularisation, 
Mushandike agrarian contracts are oral and verbal. Smallholders are promptly proffered starter 
packs (seeds, chemicals and fertilizers) by their company and their acceptance constitutes an 
indelible signature to the contract, locally known as jendiremeni kondirokiti4. These contracts are 
not memorialized or witnessed, nor are they accompanied with ritual formalizing them. This 
orality and simplicity is not an oversight on those who imagine and give form to the contracts.
As I shall point in the essay, this constitutes a strategy to maximize company claims on the 
smallholders while reducing those of the smallholder: any formal and clear contract would 
provide a basis for smallholders to claim for redress and restitution, and this is what the company 
is anxious to avoid.
Like many other private companies that have targeted Mushandike and desperate to win 
smallholders, Canners depoliticises contract farming by casting it as a gift5. The company says it 
provides the gift of contract because it is friendly to smallholders. As a friend it feels naturally 
obliged to extend its hand to another friend6. In some instances, the company cites contract 
farming as a gift intended to prepare for a great and fruitful relationship7. Presented in this way, 
contract farming is only important not for what it is but for what it makes or might make
3 Interview with Mr.. D.umbe, Mushandike, 22/7/2002. Through the essay, I have used false names for 
informants, in part to protect them from the state and the private companies with whom they do business.
4 Corruption for gentleman contract’.
3 Chipo chatinokupai’- Mr. Gavhu’s field day address to smallholders, 17/6/2002
6 Tmwi muri hama dzedu, ndizvo tichikupai zvose izvi’ Mr. Gavhu’s address to smallholders,
Mushandike, 17/6/2002.
7’ izvi zvaitinoita kutsvaga ukama’ -  Mr. Gavhu’s address to farmers, Mushandike, 17/6/2002
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possible. Finally Canners says it invites smallholders into contract farming to strengthen its 
relationship with smallholders8. It says that this invitation is the only meaningful, if not the only 
available, way the company can cement its old relationship with smallholders.
Whether presented as arising out of friendship, as an indicator of solidarity or as a mechanism to 
strengthen a relationship, the gift is always presented as making a difference in the recipient’s 
life. The company claims that contract farming uplifts smallholders through a systematic 
modernization of agriculture. Contract farming, and even the most skeptical of smallholders 
would undoubtedly nod to this assertion, lays at the door of the farm, seeds, fertilizers, 
chemicals, and the ready market, in short all the essentials for commercialization of agriculture 
(Dzingirai, 1992). For the company this transfer of technology is not only important in assuring 
productivity but also in improving the dignity of the sector and the smallholder battered by years 
of colonial strangulation9. In Mushandike especially, this political element is obviously intended 
to resonate with smallholders who although no longer colonial subjects are still its victims. Thus 
from this perspective contract fanning is not simply a gift but a dynamising one.
As I will show in the section below, contract farming is far more complicated than gifts, because 
it links smallholders to exploitative and uncontrollable markets. This simplified presentation of 
contract farming is intended to hide its exploitative nature. As I have indicated above, 
Mushandikeans are emerging from a protracted and bitter encounter with the state, and any 
outsider wishing to coerce or endear them must rely on effective strategies, including the use of 
metaphors and language. The presentation of contract fanning in these terms allow for Canners 
to reach an otherwise uncaptured or unreceptive smallholder peasantry. That the contracts are 
illusory becomes clear when one examines the nature of these contracts and how they serve to 
control smallholders.
The nature of contract 
(i) The politics of ambiguity
That the contracts are not intended to benefit smallholders is evident in the manner in which 
they are formulated. While acknowledging the inevitability of risk in growing perishable crops, 
the contracts are vague, if not silent about what the role of the company should be in the event of 
such problems arising. Thus the contracts do not commit the company to compensate the farmer 
when a proffered crop variety crushes under severe or unfamiliar weather conditions as the case 
below suggests.
In 1999 Canners provided, for the first time, farmers with a new bean variety, Michigan. The 
crop did well, which was expected because the company eagerly provided fertilizers and 
extension services and admonished smallholders to irrigate the crop liberally for maximum 
results. Trouble started when the crop was near to maturity and when it seemed that the 
smallholders would be cash in from the crop. A two-day down pour of rain destroyed the entire 
crop. The loss was enormous, as one smallholder noted.
8 Urwu rubatsiro nderwekusimbaradza ukama’. Mushandike, 17/6/2002.
9 Mr.. Gavhu’s address to smallholders, Mushandike, 17/6/2002.
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We were disappointed, because I did not get anything from my half-hectare crop. This is 
why I no longer want to grow beans for Canners10 *.
For a long time after the deed, the company did not show up in the field, a very serious error for 
smallholders used to some sort of comfort and assurance after an agricultural disaster. But while 
they could bear this neglect and in some sense expected it, they could not understand why the 
company continued to demand for the repayment of the inputs used for an inappropriate variety 
it introduced H.
In addition to making growers bear the risk of weather, the contracts do not oblige the company 
to compensate farmers whose produce perish while awaiting expected collection. This is quite 
clear from the 2000 case when smallholders lost tones of tomatoes while awaiting collection by 
the company. The incident, so deeply ingrained in social memory because it had no precedence 
and because each smallholder witnessed the daily rotting of tomatoes that had been staked at the 
homestead, caused huge financial loses on the part of the capital deficient farmers who had 
locally borrowed cash to cover both the monthly cost of water and labour. When it became 
clear that the company would not come, it was already too late and the market was already 
glutted12. During this difficult time in which five households secretly abandoned the scheme in 
favour of communal lands , farmers sold tomatoes below cost and when this failed, resorted to 
throwing the produce away. Despite the loss, the company refused to compensate farmers, only 
promising them better response next time13.
Moreover, the contracts are vague on the mode of payment. That is, the contracts are silent about 
where and when farmers receive their payment. Thus when they grew the tomatoes for the 
company in 1999, growers were not told when they would be paid, how they would be paid and 
when. Unsure about when they would be paid and where, growers have had to travel to the 
company depot, only to be told that the payment had not been processed. In one case, the 
growers’ representative was told the money would be posted. In another case, the representative 
was told the Cairns would bring the check to the growers. While the practice is unjust because 
growers cannot make concrete plans, it protects the company, allowing it to process the payment 
of farmers at its own convenience.
Finally, the contracts do not make it the responsibility of the contract to pay for any commodities 
affected while within its custody. In 2000, smallholders whose tomatoes were fortunate to be 
collected by the company could not be paid because the tomatoes were said to bad. Affected 
smallholders insist that the tomatoes were good at the time of collection, a point that would 
explain why the company agreed to collect them in the first place. If tomatoes were later 
rejected, it is because they later became so while under company care. The company however 
faulted farmers and refused to pay for the loss, an action that has led some farmers to demand a 
formal apology14.
10 Interview with Mr. Tunhira, Mushandike,
'1 Interview with Mr. Chapfuka, Mushandike, 30/6/2002
12 Interview with Mr. VeVezera, Mushandike, 30/6/2002
13 Address by Gavhu to fanners, Mushandike, 26/7/2002
14 Interview with Mr. VeVezera, Mushandike, 16/6/2002.
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Especially because doing so would entails loses on its part, the company has, rather predictably, 
refused to either correct the contracts. Smallholders have debated about instituting legal action 
against the company, but the realization that their agreements are vague and loose to make a 
strong case has prevented them from following this route. The matter is also complicated by the 
view, steeped in Mushandikeans social memory, that the legal system is intended to protect the 
educated and not the smallholder. And so it is that the smallholders remain locked in ambiguous 
contracts whose objective it is minimize their gains.
(li) The politics of clarity
While they are deliberately ambiguous in order to reduce risk and loss on the part of Canners, the 
contracts are strategically clear on what the company demands and expects of the smallholders. 
These demands, which are constantly amplified and clarified at field days and other well- 
publicized village meetings, include that fanners must grow the crop variety offered by the 
company and not just any or from any one. They must also grow it according to standard, one 
that is set by the company15. Among others things this means that they plant the crop on 
specified date, use the required fertilizers, monitor the crops for pests and diseases and water 
liberally, harvest the crop on a due date, grade it and package it. In addition to ensuring that 
smallholders remain bound to the company, these demands ensure that the company timeously 
extracts a good product from the growers.
The fourth requirement is double-barreled because smallholders must sell crops only to 
Canners and not to what it morally terms as matsotsi\ (crooks) not because these traditionally 
cheat farmers of their crops but because they threaten contract farming, a gift binding the 
smallholder and the company. The company requires that the smallholders must accept the 
price it unilaterally sets. In 2002, the company set the prices of beans at $175 per kg and $20 per 
kg for tomatoes. While appearing good, the prices were half of what was offered on the parallel 
market. Even though the company has been quick to describe the prices it provide as just, 
because they are set through consultation with big commercial farmers and because the company 
is committed to smallholder agriculture16, smallholders rightfully find, this demand unacceptable 
for two related reasons. First they hold that they are knowledgeable about costs of production, 
knowledge that is critical in determining any price. Secondly they hold that they make 
agriculture possible and therefore must be provided space and opportunity to input in pricing17. 
That the company has clung to its position and has not revised its requirements suggests that it 
considers these injunctions to be important in ensuring a predictable and cheap produce 
necessary for its own operations.
Surveillance and control
15 Interview with Mr. Tembani, Mutare, 12/7/2002
16 Mr. Gavhu, Mushandike, 26/6/2002/
17 Mr. Chivanda, 27/7/2002
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Amplifying company position through meetings and demonstrations is not adequate to make the 
cunning and craft farmers comply with the contracts. As part of ensuring continued smallholder 
compliance, the company has developed a pervasive monitoring and control mechanism. The 
first form of control is internal and relies on social capital. Farmers are all organized in groups of 
which there is one in the village under study. Farmers are given inputs on condition that they 
persuade one another to honor their debts to the company or that they all market their produce to 
the company18 Since villagers must know and associate with each, the company hopes that they 
will use this intimate interaction to discipline each other in dealings with it. They expect us to be 
their ZRP’19 While it ensures the delivery of some produce to the company, this mechanism 
does not fully deliver full and desired results. This is mainly for two reasons. The first is that 
smallholders have gradually come to view Canners as an enemy from which members should 
certainly shield one another20. The second reason is that smallholders while increasingly 
becoming a community with shared norms and beliefs, they are not as yet one. Unlike other 
resettlement areas where people migrate into as whole communities (Madzudzo, 1996), in 
Mushandike, smallholders share diverse backgrounds in part because they were drawn by lots 
and cast onto mapped villages. It is therefore difficult and sometimes dangerous for the groups to 
persuade each other to confirm to a certain pattern. Farmer groups which represent Canners and 
encourage smallholders to pay up their debts are often threatened with punishment by those who 
have been aggrieved by the company21. The dissatisfaction with social capital has shifted the 
company’s position from one relying with internal forms of control to those that are externally 
reinforced.
The externally based form of control has taken the form of planting, within the midst of the 
resettlement scheme, munhu wave/22, or company agent reporting to the office in Mutare. The 
groundsman’s role is cast as that of co -facilitating with AREX farming among farmers, teaching 
farmers to do proper farming and serving as a strategic link with the office23. In practice his 
function is mainly to reduce company risk. This he does by ensuring that farmers plant the right 
variety and on time, monitoring the health of the plants, alerting the company to take any 
remedial action of any diseases outbreak, which might affect crop production and delivery. But 
his most important function is preventing leakage of contracted products. This he does by 
policing and surveillance. With his red motorcycle, he crisscrosses the resettlement scheme, 
scanning the landscape for illegal marketers whose details are noted down in the computer. He 
surveys the crop and once its ripens, provides packing materials (sacks for beans and crates for 
tomatoes) and alerts the company to promptly dispatch a specified haulage truck to a specified 
location. All the time, he makes himself visible to the villagers, especially those whose crop is
18 Interview with Chivanda, Mushandike, 27/7/2002.
19 Interview with Mr. Moyo, Mushandike, 27/7/2002. ZRP stands for the country’s police, Zimbabwe 
Republic Police. The force is o f  course not very effective in controlling criminal behaviour, but the point 
o f  the informant is that Canners is using local people to influence behaviour.
20 Interview with Mr. Chidyamakono, 12/8/2002.
21 Interview with Mr. Chivanda, 16/6/2002
22 Munhu wavo does not simply describe another person. Rather it suggests a person who does not fit 
within the moral community o f  smallholders, one representing aliens while at the same time claiming to 
be part o f  it.
23 In fact the company refers to him as ’mudumeni’, a corruption o f  demonstrator. Demonstrators used to 
be colonial agents for agricultural change.
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ready, the point being to convey the notion that they are being watched for any possible
mischief24. '
Even though this appears quite exhaustive, the company is not altogether contend with the results 
and is busy realigning its policy to keep farmers in control. In addition to the surveillance, the 
company also threatens the people with desertion. Thus it has been threatening smallholders 
with desertion should they continue to interrogate and contesting its marketing policy. Because 
smallholders do not mind about being deserted25, and because they sense the company to be 
desperate for cheap agricultural produce26, it is very likely that they will simply ignore the threats 
of desertion. Perhaps aware that this policy will not adequately work, the company is upgrading 
it to a more robust strategy organized around fear. I give two cases intimating this new direction. 
At a 2002 village meeting when farmers criticized the company for unilaterally fixing price and 
for treating farmers as small children, a Canners official threatened to auction the properties of 
defaulting smallholders, from chickens, donkeys, goats to cattle, a threat that was understood by 
smallholders who value and whose livelihoods depend on livestock. So worried were 
smallholders that they asked for the speaker to move to another matter on the agenda not 
involving auctions and attachments. At yet another meeting, the same official threatened to have 
jailed smallholders who contested the price set by the company and sold their produce to other 
lucrative markets. When it is considered jails are centers of extreme forms of violence, this 
threat, which is illegal because it is not based on law, constitute a very serious form of control 
especially to the vulnerable growers who understand it otherwise. I
Peasant views
Before concluding this essay, it is useful to systematically document how peasants are viewing 
contract fanning and how it is operationalised. Such a treatment will enable us to understand 
peasant behavior as well as enable us to chart the way forward for contract farming in the 
resettlement areas of Zimbabwe.
When it comes to contract farming, smallholders have an unresolved tension. On the one hand, 
contract farming has broken down the barriers and brought inputs closer to them as never 
before27. They now have access to fertilizers, seeds and most important of all, the technical 
know-how to grow these crops28, unlike their communal areas counterparts (Kinsey, 2000). For 
this, farmers are thankful, and indeed welcome private business. At the same time however, 
smallholders are upset by what contract fanning is doing to them. They say that Canners buys 
their products for mahara ’, for nothing, and always according to a price they unilaterally set, a
24 The agent beliefs that if  there is an reduction in side-marketing its because o f  me; ’ I have locked these 
guys in by my visibility’. Interview with Tembani, Mutare, 12/7/2002.
25 Interview with Mr.s. Simbi, Mushandike2/6/2002.
26 As one o f  the farmer noted, it is because Canners can’t find cheap agricultural produce that it is coming 
to Mushandike.
27 Interview with Mr. Dhubhe, Mushandike, 26/7/2002.
28 Interview with Mr. Chapfuka, Mushandike, 13/6/2002.
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situation that they claim has reduced them to being mere labourers for the company29 or, as some 
say, to being impoverished slaves30.
Yet despite this corporate despotism, smallholders remain as partners to Canners. For the 
majority of such smallholders, this continued patronization of Canners is a function of poverty.
I have many times thought o f ending the contract, but poverty pushes one to work with 
crooks and robbers
Among Mushandikeans, there is no doubt that this poverty arises not from laziness or fault of 
their own but rather from the perennial low prices offered by the company31. Indeed, it is this 
perception that leads them to regard Canners in criminal terms such as those used above. But 
how poverty actually causes continued relationship with Canners is not too clear; it seems 
however, that the condition prevents farmers from being self reliant in ways that enable them to 
raise their inputs or source appropriate markets. The situation is made worse by declining 
support from kinsmen, a trend that has been put in motion by the economic reform programme 
(Bouman, 1992). The second reason relates to the absence of viable alternatives as the remark by 
Mr. Mapingure suggests:
The reason we continue to work with this despot Canners, is because there is no other 
contract to be signed.
But there is; a third reason explaining for the continued relationship between smallholders and the 
company. Smallholders say that the contracts allow them to grow beans and tomatoes which can 
be sold, consumed and even privately sold on the black market. As in other irrigation schemes, 
there is not even one single smallholder who does not confess to either side marketing or storing 
some of the contracted crops for their own use (Manzungu and van der Zaag, 1996). The town of 
Masvingo, the nearby business center, the adjacent drought stricken areas, the mobile indigenous 
businessmen -  all those provide a ready or, as the smallholders say, a fast market for crops under 
contract32. The practice is so widespread that Canners estimate that it looses up to 50% of the 
crop to black market33. But having to prosper through theft, and having to undertake risk 
operations in order to be improving their welfare is an unbearable condition, one that 
smallholders are bitter about. Smallholders say it is undignified for them to have to conduct 
business in the darkness as if farming is criminal activity'34. That they reconcile themselves to 
this, and continue being parties to contract farming suggests their realization that they can 
accumulate and prosper resources mostly as thieves and criminals. But this is a hypothesis 
requiring further support.
Conclusion,
29 Interview with Mr. Magevha, Mushandike, 28/7/2002.
30 Interview with Mr. Mhitimi, Mushandike, 28/7/2002.
31 Interview with Madasimbi, Mushandike, 26/6/2002.
32 The term for fast markets is kwekumanyisa, a place where one quickly sells something.
33 Interview with Mr.. Tembani, Mutare, 12/8/2002.
34 Interview with Vezera, Mushandike, 8/9/2001.
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If there is anything major from this essay, it is that the new agrarian contracts have, as with the 
old state-peasant contracts, not introduced meaningful opportunities for Mushandike 
smallholders beyond improving access to inputs. The contracts, it seems, have done more to 
improve Canners’ control of smallholder agricultural production and to match the same 
production to its own industrial operation. This interlocking of agriculture to industrial operation 
has inevitably limited opportunities for the smallholder and the negative disposition to contract 
farming bears testimony to this. What does the case of Mushandike say about contract farming as 
a practice?
While it will be misleading to look at it as no more than an instrument to enslave smallholder 
agriculture, as a tool to extract as much as possible from smallholder agriculture with limited 
risks, contract farming is not apolitical and unproblematic as states and their new partners 
customarily represent them. As the case suggests, there are entrenched interests in the practice 
and it is these interests, which express themselves in the politics of ambiguity and clarity, one 
where the powerful strategically remain vague to reduce claims on them and correspondingly 
clarify contractual aspects to increase their claims on the smallholder. It is this politicisisation of 
agrarian contracts, which engenders hostility of the smallholders, who however are disorganized 
and different to restrain Canners. What does this all mean for resettlement, land reform in 
Zimbabwe? Can these agrarian contracts unlock opportunities for the newly resettled farmers, 
and in the process justify land reform and redistribution in Zimbabwe.
Resettlement farmers, especially because they are starting farmers will require some sort of 
partnership that makes possible the access to markets and inputs. In fact given the remoteness 
and inaccessibility of the new resettlement areas and the limited ability of government to remedy 
the situation, the degree to which these farmers will succeed will depend on their ability to 
mobilize these resources, and so some partnership with the private sector is not only desirable 
but also necessary. Simply unleashing private business on smallholder resettlement scheme does 
not automatically unlock the intended opportunities, in fact may make things worse, as the case 
study suggests too well. Part of the problem is that holders are small and are dealing with 
powerful and equipped partners whom they cannot restrain. The challenge therefore is to provide 
that capacity to smallholders and enable them to do business with the private sector on an equal 
basis. That means getting the different and individual farmers organized into associations, which 
protect collective interests. Experience elsewhere has demonstrated that community 
organizations work well when they in turn form alliances with other groups with similar 
interests, groups like trade unions, non governmental organizations, student movements, human 
rights groups, lawyers and academics. Perhaps by networking broadly beyond the field can 
smallholders tackle private business whose York has proved heavy. And perhaps it is such 
politics that will justify and edify land resettlement and land reform.
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